About

Since russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has been rapidly developing one of the most technologically advanced and battle-hardened fighting forces in the world. A vast variety of drone technologies is enabled by a vibrant technology sector, which has made scarce resources a virtue, building on world-class engineering expertise and the can-do spirit.

The goal of the Ukrainian Drone Ecosystem Directory is to share Ukraine’s battlefield experience and the evolving approach to drone warfare with NATO countries and their allies.

Many modern armies are unprepared for modern warfare augmented by a variety of unmanned systems, also known as drones. Most military personnel have not been exposed to the latest technologies: they haven’t seen or practiced using FPV drones, reconnaissance drones, unmanned surface vessels, or ground robotic systems. That could prove costly for them down the line.

To achieve drone dominance, NATO and its allies need to mass-produce low-cost systems, reduce oversight delays, and grant procurement authority directly to combat units. In short, an updated, clear, responsive strategy for unmanned systems is needed.

Unmanned systems are already widely used worldwide for various civilian purposes, including crop monitoring, delivering cargo to remote locations, the rapid transport of blood and organs, and unmanned evacuations from danger zones.

But the real difference lies in their military applications, an area where NATO & allies may be missing opportunities and could learn from its ally, Ukraine, which has emerged as a global leader in drone warfare.

Ukraine’s more than 500 drone manufacturers offer a shocking array of systems. Naval drones are used to disable enemy fleets and attack bridges. Ground drones perform remote mining, cargo transport, and frontline evacuations. Fiber-optic drones can withstand extreme electronic warfare conditions. Interceptor drones fly faster than the enemy’s and neutralize them as a cost-effective alternative to air defence missiles.

That said, what works in Ukraine might not work elsewhere, and vice versa. 

While small attack UAVs have revolutionized warfare in Ukraine—responsible for strikes resulting in 75% of the enemy’s combat losses in personnel and equipment—they may not fit combat conditions elsewhere. “Ukrainian Armed Forces rely on FPV drones because of real shortages in manpower and artillery needed on the frontline. FPVs are 100% important, but the question is, is that the right balance of capabilities we should be aiming for?” commented Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Large MQ-9B drones, known as Reapers, from the US-based General Atomics, have shown limited effectiveness in conflict zones like Ukraine and Yemen, where several have been shot down. 

“The cost of losing even one is substantial,” according to Ukrainian reconnaissance drone producer Airlogix.

Researching the market and testing to identify the capabilities that are genuinely needed among the hundreds of drone types available is the best policy advice anyone can offer. And ultimately, the military must determine those needs.

 “Instead of chasing off-the-shelf solutions, we need to define what capabilities we actually require — is it short-range FPV drones, or long-range platforms with heavy payload capacity? Do we need logistics support, autonomous flight in contested environments, or advanced mapping and target identification? Those answers lie with military commanders,” says Brian D. Fentiman, CEO of British Columbia–based BlueForce UAV Consulting.

Unlike its adversary, Ukraine has decentralized the production and procurement of unmanned systems, tailoring them to real-time feedback from military units on the ground, rather than relying on top-down decisions from Kyiv.

It has recently created a military marketplace dubbed the “Amazon for the Military,” where units can directly browse products offered by the industry and place orders based on their specific needs.

This is an advantage even Russian forces would like to have, but (luckily for Ukraine) it remains out of reach due to their rigid, state-controlled system.

In addition to strategically identifying operational needs, NATO & allies should aim to localize drone production, with substantial government support behind that effort.

As Nicolas Breidi from the Montreal-based start-up L’aube étoilée puts it: “Like in many other countries, most drone components (motors, electronics) still come from China. So, the question is: should a drone company aim for full autonomy? I believe we must learn how to produce everything ourselves — motors, electronics, and even processors.”

While this is a difficult task, it offers significant benefits once achieved: independence from unpredictable geopolitical risks and unstable partnerships.

Ukraine is also facing the localization challenge. While many of its drones still depend on imported electronics, fiber-optic cables, and optics from China, Israel, and beyond, the country is making strides toward localization. In March of 2025, Ukrainian firm Vyriy Drones presented 1,000 fully domestically produced FPV drones — a milestone that proved self-reliance is possible. The Ukrainian government now offers incentives and long-term contracts for companies that achieve 50% or greater localization.

There are several opportunities for both the NATO & allies’ public and private sectors to learn from Ukraine’s approach to the production, procurement, and deployment of unmanned systems.

Recently, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced plans to open Ukraine’s defence production facilities abroad, noting that talks are underway with countries including Denmark, Norway, the UK, and Canada. Just days later, Ukraine and the UK reached a landmark agreement: Ukraine will share frontline data with British firms to accelerate the mass production of drones. 

As the UK Ministry of Defence put it, “Technology data sets from Ukraine’s front line are set to be plugged into UK production lines, allowing British defence firms to rapidly design and build, at scale, cutting-edge military equipment available nowhere else in the world.” We may learn more about the upcoming Ukraine–Canada partnership agreement(s) in the coming weeks, but the process needs to accelerate.

Times have changed, and now NATO & allies have much to learn from their Ukrainian counterparts, especially when it comes to drone warfare. This is not without precedent: in April, Denmark announced it would send unarmed military personnel to Ukraine for short-term drone warfare training. A similar initiative by Canada could deepen its understanding of the urgency surrounding unmanned systems and help clarify what is truly needed for Canada’s own defence priorities.

The primary lesson to be learned from Ukraine is the importance of adapting quickly. Not to get bogged down in bureaucracy, but to restructure government programs and institutions in a way that allows rapid investment in private companies capable of delivering fast, effective solutions within the country, rather than looking abroad for ready-made fixes that may not fully meet national needs. 

NATO & allies could learn from how Ukraine handled the first year of russia’s full-scale invasion: how it launched grant programs, reformed its state apparatus, and streamlined the standardization and certification of UAVs. That’s the direction to take now so that more drones can be produced and used more effectively.

Ukraine’s experience shows that even under extreme pressure, it’s possible to build a dynamic, decentralized drone industry and rethink what modern defence looks like.

While most NATO countries are currently involved in an armed conflict, the increasing global militarization and geopolitical tensions demand attention. The absence of an immediate conflict provides an opportunity for NATO & allies to thoroughly study lessons from modern battlefields and build a robust industrial base and a skilled workforce prepared to meet future challenges.

NATO & allies have the talent, the tech base, and the strategic need. What they lack is urgency. In today’s world, sovereignty isn’t just about geography: it’s about who controls the technologies. NATO & allies face a critical choice: to take the lead in innovation and defence modernization or risk falling further behind.